Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, And Corporate Value Of Companies Listed At The Nairobi Securities Exchange by Onguka, David et al.
 
ESJ Social Sciences 
 
www.eujournal.org                                                                                                                             300 
Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership 
Structure, And Corporate Value Of Companies Listed At The 
Nairobi Securities Exchange 
 
David Onguka  
PhD Candidate, School of Business, Department of Finance and Accounting, 
University of Nairobi, Kenya  
Prof. Cyrus M. Iraya  
Dr. Winnie L. Nyamute 
Lecturers, School of Business, Department of Finance and Accounting, 
University of Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Doi:10.19044/esj.2021.v17n15p300  
Submitted: 19 October 2020 
Accepted: 27 April 2021 
Published: 31 May 2021 
Copyright 2021 Author(s)  




Onguka D., Iraya C.M. &  Nyamute W.L. (2021). Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, 
Ownership Structure, And Corporate Value Of Companies Listed At The Nairobi Securities 
Exchange.  
European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 17(15), 300. https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2021.v17n15p300 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on establishing the relationship among corporate 
governance, capital structure, ownership structure, and firm value for 
companies listed at the Nairobi Security Exchange (NSE). The study tested 
three hypotheses that explored various aspects of this relationship: First, there 
is no intervening effect on the capital structure on the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate value; Second, there is no significant 
moderating effect of ownership structure on the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate value; and finally, there is no significant 
joint effect of corporate governance, capital structure, and ownership structure 
on corporate value. The data of the study was obtained from audited financial 
statements of the firms listed at the NSE. A census survey for sixty-four 
publicly trading firms at the NSE was undertaken. The data of 64 corporations 
was cleaned, leaving a smaller number of 58 firms which formed over 90% of 
the sample. The analysis covered a five-year period between 2013 to 2017. 
The study adopted a positivism philosophy and a descriptive design. 
Descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests were undertaken and thereafter 
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inferential statistics, specifically correlation and regression analysis, were 
used for hypothesis testing. The multiple regression analysis was used to test 
the relationship among corporate governance, capital structure, ownership 
structure, and corporate value. The panel data procedure was considered more 
appropriate as the sample data contained both cross-sectional and time-series 
data. The Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach was used to assess the 
intervening and moderating effect of capital structure and ownership structure 
respectively on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
value. Corporate Governance was measured by a composite of board 
independence, board size, board remuneration, and corporate gender diversity. 
Capital structure was measured by leverage, while ownership structure was 
measured by ownership concentration, state ownership, family ownership, and 
foreign ownership. Firm performance was measured using the Tobin Q. The 
joint effect of corporate governance, capital structure, and ownership structure 
on corporate value was found to be positive and significant. However, 
Ownership structure and capital structure had no significant moderating and 
intervening effects respectively on the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate value. This study makes an original contribution as 
it takes a more holistic approach of corporate governance development by 
probing whether improving corporate governance is linked to the enhanced 
corporate value. The study recommends that corporate shareholders, boards, 
regulators, and management of listed corporations should put in place robust 
policies. This will ensure the implementation and monitoring of corporate 
governance principles and ensure congruence in their activities of the 
oversight of corporate objectives of optimizing corporate value and 
minimizing fraud and failure risks of corporations.
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, 
Corporate Value, Agency Theory
Introduction 
The corporate governance subject has stimulated much empirical 
research in finance and economics since Smith's (1776) key seminal 
publication which analyzed the characteristics and sources of wealth among 
nations. Corporate governance denotes the rules and principles established by 
the management to regulate affairs and effectively manage the company's 
resources to add value to the company and achieve maximum returns for 
shareholders (Haque & Arun, 2016). It is therefore a framework of rules, 
relationships, systems, and processes that provide a structure for exercising 
authority, securing financial resources and other resources, and controlling 
corporations to enable companies create value while providing accountability 
and control systems to hold actors responsible for their individual and 
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collective actions. The established structures support value creation through 
entrepreneurialism, innovativeness, development, and exploration by 
management and directors while proving incentives to align shareholders and 
management interests. It involves directing and managing systems, people, 
and resources, which is an important key in creating value. Studies have 
documented that the use of functional corporate governance guidelines 
strengthens investors’ confidence in obtaining profits (Alqisie, 2014). 
Ownership structure forms a central base in the linkage between corporation 
governance and value as the owners’ goal is to maximize their returns by 
strengthening governance issues. According to Holderness (2016), ownership 
structure can be influenced greatly by environment such as whether there are 
high chances of perquisite consumption or not and whether the capital 
structure imposes adequate pressure on management to increase company’s 
value.  
Agency theory is the anchoring theory of the study because it is 
instrumental in the conceptualization of how firm value interacts with 
corporate governance. It may result in agency conflicts if the management 
starts to pursue personal interests conflicting those of the stockholders 
(Calomiris & Carlson, 2016). It helps us understand the importance of having 
a strong corporate governance mechanism in firms and how they impact their 
performance. The theory informs us of the importance of managing the 
relationship between owners and managers which influences the performance 
of corporations to a great extent. Thus, the tradeoff model conceptualized the 
intervening link of capital structure on the relationship between corporate 
governance and company value. The theory asserts that entities would desire 
to use debt finance up until the gains arising from tax-shields matches the 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) authored 
the theory and hypothesized that trade-off scenario exists between an entity’s 
optimal debt-equity ratio and its impact on agency costs, taxes, and bankruptcy 
costs.  
This study aims to establish the cause of corporation’s failures and 
underperformance which have continued to increase in frequency and 
magnitude at NSE despite different measures instituted by the supervisory 
authorities like the CMA and the Central Bank. Although the implementation 
and improvement of corporate governance regulations and principles has 
made a significant contribution in improving NSE listed firms’ performance, 
the number of cases of underperformance and failure is still increasing 
(Dominic & Memba, 2015). As such, recently in 2015, the CMA placed 
Nakummat and Uchumi Supermarkets under statutory management. In 
addition, Kenya Airways and Mumias sugar - despite several bailout by the 
Kenyan Government - still continue to experience huge losses. Several authors 
have ascribed this problem to financial difficulties and inefficient corporate 
European Scientific Journal, ESJ                             ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
May 2021 edition Vol.17, No.15 
www.eujournal.org   303 
governance (Peters & Bagshaw, 2014). Latest studies suggest that this deeply 
mirrors weaknesses in corporate governance, ranging from complacency 
board in oversight to inadequate controls, and the management’s poor strategic 
foresight (Opiyo, 2013; Vincent et al., 2015). 
Corporate governance, capital structure, and ownership structure are 
key concepts that have been interconnected with corporate value analysis in 
several existing studies. Agency theory and several other mechanisms of 
corporate governance contend that good corporate governance enhances 
entity’s performance (Haque & Arun, 2016). The regulatory framework 
implemented by Capital Market Authority and tight reporting oversight of 
NSE has been instrumental in improving corporate performance thereby 
proving their effectiveness to a reasonable extent (M’Ithiria & Musyoki, 
2014). Regardless of the various interventions, Kenya has documented several 
cases of corporate governance weaknesses and poor capital structure practices 
among listed companies at NSE resulting to receivership/statutory 
management and liquidation. The number of cases keeps rising, especially at 
CMC Motors, and consecutive loss reporting by firms such as Kenya Airways 
and Mumias Sugar is a sign that poor corporate governance practices persist 
despite these improvements (Ali, 2018).   
Corporate governance has been discussed in the context of privately 
and state-owned entities where corruption, malpractice, and subsidization by 
the government of failing listed enterprises like Mumias Sugar, Kenya 
Airways among other firms remain the defining attributes. In 2017 for 
instance, fashions retailer Deacons (EA) and Cement maker ARM were also 
placed under statutory management due to excessive losses and high debt.  
Numerous studies have been undertaken in industrialized states but the 
outcome of the studies – even though contradictory in most cases – cannot be 
unreservedly generalized to emerging states due to societal, cultural, and 
economic divergences between the developed and developing nations (Carter 
& Greer, 2013; Chen, 2012; Hasan & Butt, 2009). Other studies have 
considered individual variables relationships on firm value (Dominic & 
Memba, 2015). The question is - what is the impact of corporate governance 
on corporate value of NSE listed companies? 
However, the key objective of this research aims to evaluate the 
relationship among corporate governance, capital structure, ownership 
structure, and corporate value of NSE listed companies. The specific 
objectives of the research include the following: 
i. To assess the intervening effect of capital structure on the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate value of NSE listed 
firms. 
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ii.  To investigate the effect of ownership structure on the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate value of NSE listed 
firms. 
iii. To evaluate the joint effect of corporate governance, capital 




Good corporate governance cannot be described by a single theory. 
Thus, it remains vital to combine different theories that not only address social 
interactions, but also highlight rules and laws, as well as stringent 
enforcement, that relate to good practices of governance and go beyond 
mechanical approaches of explaining CG. For this reason, it is important that 
the holistic implementation is promoted in the entire corporate world, which 
brings a different perspective of corporate management with it. Governance in 
diverse countries can differ based on their political, cultural, historical, and 
social situations. In such cases, the governance in developing and developed 
states can differ since it is subject to the economic and cultural perspectives of 
every state (Wicks & Parmar, 2014). The anchoring theory is agency theory. 
The other theory considered to compliment agency theory is the trade-off 
theory. These theories are linked to the study in that they are reflecting the 
basis of governance practices and how this affects the corporate value. 
Agency theory was founded by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and they 
indicated that the agency theory is instrumental in corporate governance 
literature, standards, principles, and governance codes. Anderson, Becker, and 
Campbell (2014) made available an extensive review of CG theories, arguing 
that an agency model is best since it aptly explains the role of corporate 
governance towards company performance. When critically examined, agency 
theory basically deals with the resolution of two problems that arise due to 
agency relationships (Velte, 2017). The foremost problem occurs when there 
is a conflict between the agent and principals when their wants or goals 
conflict, while the second issue occurs when it becomes costly or difficult for 
a principal to confirm what an agent action. The model postulates that prudent 
CG mechanisms align executives and directors’ interest with the welfare of 
owners leading to an efficient and optimal capital structure choices which, 
when combined with ownership structure, leads to better corporate value. In 
agency relationships, the basic function of independent directors includes, 
among other things, overseeing management performance in achieving agreed 
objectives, overseeing performance reporting, and satisfying financial 
integrity, and optimizing resilient and defensible financial controls and capital 
structure (Mang’unyi, 2011). Thus, effective involvement of directors in 
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monitoring and supervision of activities and reports of management can 
greatly improve governance and financial performance. 
Agency theory critics argue that it only focuses on different 
relationships, thus ignoring the convergence of interrelationships among 
different parties and their interdependencies (Hasan & Butt, 2009). Such 
parties are distinct in nature and have mutual associations that cannot easily 
be linked to the theory’s divergent viewpoint. Not all agents are self-centred 
and opportunistic because there are those who act as real ship captains if 
rewards and compensation are made to their satisfaction. Donaldson and 
Davies (1994) findings also indicate that where a manager has served in a 
company for a long time, help shape and mould its form and directions, there 
is likely to be a melding of individual self-esteemed with corporate prestige. 
Other stakeholders like employees and banks are also likely affected by the 
appropriation policy of management and may oppose or expose such actions. 
This theory is of great relevance to this study as it aids in understanding the 
relationship between the organization management and its owners. It also 
helps us understand the importance of having strong corporate governance 
mechanisms in firms and how they impact their performance. Kenya’s 
financial institutions are managed by executives on behalf of shareholders. 
The agency problems are evident in most scandals that have faced some of the 
institutions under this study. This theory is thus applicable for this study, as it 
informs us of the importance of managing this relationship between owners 
and managers which influences the performance of corporations to a great 
extent. According to Robbins and Judge (2017), reducing agency tensions 
results in a friendly working environment and, hence, agency cost is reduced 
leading to efficient operational, financing, and investing activities. 
Trade-off theory argument on the existence of an ideal capital structure that 
optimizes corporate value will motivate management to implement corporate 
governance best practices that would enable them to achieve this debt level. 
The uniqueness of this optimal tax level to the different companies means that 
investors would prefer investing in corporation with higher optimal level gain 
accelerated returns both from debt and capital invested. The debt tax benefits 
and the control of free cash-flow difficulties forces companies to make greater 
use of leverage which also positively influences management to invest in 
projects with positive cash flow, thereby optimizing corporate value. Critics 
of this theory point out that high debts level result in financial distress and 
bankruptcy and may therefore result in reduction of corporate value. In 
efficient and perfect markets, Modigliani and Miller (1958) illustrated that the 
structure of financing was irrelevant in determining the cost of funds and an 
entity’s value, thus contradicting the model. The attainment of ideal capital 
structure is assumed to be the basis of market efficiency and symmetric 
information which is not always the reality – this makes it difficult to 
European Scientific Journal, ESJ                             ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
May 2021 edition Vol.17, No.15 
www.eujournal.org   306 
operationalize. The relevance of this theory is the ability to support the 
conceptualization of the intervening impact of capital structure on the 
interrelationship between CG and corporate value. The theory indicates that 
businesses will choose their equity and debt financing mix to offset the 
benefits and costs of debt. High financial leverage may result in improved 
efficiency by reducing agency costs because of fear of bankruptcy which 
would result in losses to executives in form of remunerations, incentives, 
reputation and the pressure to make cash flows to repay periodic debt and 
interest expenses. The relationship between the right action of management in 
adherence to good corporate governance, capital structure decision, and their 
effort to optimize corporate value to wade-off bankruptcy helps to 
conceptualize the relationship, thereby predicting the intervening effect of 
capital structure on the relation between CG and corporate value. 
 
Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, and 
Company Value  
The empirical analysis of the relationship among corporate 
governance, capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate value has not 
provided an explicit causal link amongst the variables. Majority of previous 
studies pose methodological, theoretical, and contextual gaps. The agency 
theory argues that control and ownership separation create conflicting interests 
whereas in trade-off theory, no such conflicts are envisaged. Most of the 
earlier studies reviewed have investigated the interrelationships between the 
two or the three variables and documented conflicting and inconclusive 
results.  
Adera et al. (2015) examined the link between debt-equity ratio and 
stock values of NSE manufacturing companies. They applied the explanatory 
nonexperimental design with the authors undertaking a census of nine entities. 
Pearson Correlation - (2-tailed) Pearson analysis - was employed. The 
outcomes documented a significant positive association between preference 
share capital, long-term leverage, reserves, ordinary equity and the firm’s 
performance. The research did not consider moderating variables on the 
relationship nor the corporate governance influence in the relationship. Recent 
empirical research shows that implementation of the best practices of 
corporate governance remains a challenge for quoted Kenyan companies and 
regionally. These best practices include shareholders rights protection, clear 
definition of stakeholder roles as well as defining board responsibilities for 
optimizing company value. Providing an answer to this gap is foundational 
and fundamental in ensuring optimal corporate growth and performance which 
is the need for the current study. 
Driffield, Mahambare, and Pal (2005) studied whether ownership 
structure affects debt-equity ratio and ROA. They applied firm-level panel 
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data 3rd level least square method (3SLS) method. They obtained evidence 
from the popular belief that bureaucratic controls hamper the growth of firm 
value. It is possible to extend this study to include mediating influence of 
capital structure on corporate value and governance aspects and note the 
resulting changes in results.  
Hasan and Butt (2009) examined how corporate governance and 
ownership structure affected Pakistani listed companies’ capital structure. The 
study adopted fixed-effect regression technique. The findings show that 
ownership structure and corporate governance had a significant effect on the 
capital structure. If the study were to be taken one step further by corporate 
value, the results would be more robust. The main objective of the shareholder 
is to optimize returns on investment. Therefore, extending the study to include 
corporate governance would provide the necessary focus and attention to 
shareholders key objective. This gap was therefore adequately responded to 
by the current study which has recognized agency theory as the anchoring 
theory and focused on investigating how the gap between ownership and 
control can be minimized to optimize shareholders value creation. 
Holderness (2016) investigated how ownership structure and debt-
equity ratio affects entity’s performance in his study of Vietnamese quoted 
corporations. The study employed OLS and regression methods for the data 
analysis. The study documented an adverse effect of foreign ownership on 
leverage, but a positive effect by state ownership. The study considered 
ownership structure and debt-equity ratio combine effect on firm performance 
but did not consider the moderating influence of ownership structure nor the 
intervening impacts of debt-equity on firm performance which this study has 
now incorporated. There is, however, a need to incorporate a variable that 
would address the often-sighted need for taking adequate measures to boost 
the proficiency and efficiency of governance structure in firms. 
Studies relating to corporate governance and business performance 
have yielded contradictory and inconclusive outcomes. Some studies 
documented positive relationships, while others reported either negative or no 
relationships at all. A possible explanation for the contradictions and conflicts 
could be the exclusion of intervening and moderating effects. However, the 
studies use different measure of the explanatory and response variables in 
addition to methodological differences. Most of the studies on the four 
concepts have been undertaken in developed markets that vary due to market 
efficiencies, regulatory as well as legal environments. Furthermore, limited 
studies have evaluated the intervention and moderation effects of capital 
structure and ownership structure at the same time. Given the methodological 
and the contextual gaps, the inconsistent and sometimes inconclusive findings, 
this is a research area which needs current and future investigation. The above 
analysis leads to the three hypotheses tested by the study. 
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Hypothesis 1: There is no significant intervening effect of capital 
structure on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
value of NSE listed firms. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant moderating effect of ownership 
structure on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
value of NSE listed firms. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant joint effect of corporate 
governance, capital structure, and ownership structure on corporate value of 
NSE listed firms. 
 
The Conceptual Framework 
Figure 1 displays the study’s conceptual model showing corporate 
governance, capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate value 
interrelationships. The figure depicts that CG influences corporate value in 
several ways. Corporate governance can affect corporate value indirectly 
through capital structure. The directors hired by the firm owners during 
General Meetings do not participate in the normal operating activities of the 
company, but rather oversee the management’s activities and approve critical 
decisions of the management in the company. One of the key decision 
management makes, which requires the director’s approval, is the capital 
structure decision. Hypothesis one, therefore, proposes the intervening effect 
of capital structure on the relationship between CG and corporate value. Both 
Trade-off theory and agency theory supports this hypothesis. 
Corporate Governance could also influence corporate value through 
the moderation of the ownership structure. The directors are the link between 
the management and the owners, and they provide the owners with 
information regarding management strategies approved by them or suggested 
by the management. In addition, they receive direction from the owners on 
fundamental strategic changes as well as visions, mission, and key objectives. 
Ownership structure has been documented based on empirical studies to 
influence entity value, although the direction and nature of the effect are not 
clear. The common ownership structure attributes are ownership 
concentration, foreign, state, and family ownerships. Hypothesis two, 
therefore, proposes that ownership structure moderates the relationship 
between CG and firm value. This hypothesis is supported by agency theory – 
relating to agency costs resulting from the separation of control from 
ownership as agents take charge of the firm. Corporate governance, capital 
structure, and ownership structure could jointly affect corporate performance. 
From past empirical studies, each of these variables has been documented by 
scholars to have some effect (positive, negative, or none) on corporate value. 
The joint effect of the variables has also been investigated by few scholars. 
Consequently, the third hypothesis assessed the joint influence of corporate 
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governance, capital structure, and ownership structure on corporate value and 
is supported by both agency theory and trade-off theory. 
Participants in the age group between 51 and 80 show higher cognitive 
and behavioral values. The following table shows the scores of general 

















Figure 1. The Conceptual Model 
Source: Author (2021) 
 
Research Methodology 
The methodology steps adopted by the study include research 
philosophy, study design, targeted population, collection of data, diagnostic 
tests, operationalization, and analysis of data. The study was premised on the 
positivism research philosophy as it tested several quantitative hypotheses. 
The descriptive design was appropriate since the study’s key variables were 
defined and the study hypotheses and research questions were clearly 
indicated. Cooper and Schidler (2008) supported this position by arguing that 
descriptive design is suitable for a research in which research questions or 
hypotheses have already been formulated. The population consists of 58 firms 
listed at the NSE covering 2013 to 2017. This study used quantitative 
secondary data collected in Microsoft excel for a five-year period. The data 
was obtained from publicly trading companies past financial accounts from 
the companies’ websites and other accounts filed with NSE. Where the 
required data was not accessible, it was directly requested from firms’ 
management.  
Various diagnostic tests were undertaken to validify and justify the 
regression results to determine if the regression model was unbiased. These 
were done given that it is impractical to achieve accurate and reliable 
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deductions about reality when the population which the sample was derived 
from is invalid (Creswell, 2013). The conventional linear regression model is 
founded on various assumptions including linearity, multivariate normality, 
little or no multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and no or little autocorrelation. 
Autocorrelation arises when residuals fail to be independent of one another 
and the Durbin-Watson (1985) statistics (1.5<d<2.5) was employed to assess 
panel data autocorrelation. The ANOVA linearity test was employed to assess 
the study variables linearity with non-linearity being insignificant if the 
computed F-value of the non-linear indicator is more than 0.05. 
Multicollinearity arises when explanatory variables are not independent from 
the other, which indicates that one explanatory variable can be linearly 
predicted by the other variables with some degree of accuracy (Kothari, 2004). 
Multicollinearity was evaluated through the VIF (Tolerance) test. 
Multicollinearities exist if the VIF value is more than 10 and the tolerance 
value is not far from 1. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the residuals variance 
fails to be constant across all observations and was assessed using the 
Levene’s test. Here, the assumption that the variations in the populations from 
which different samples were taken were the same was assessed. Linear 
regression analysis also requires the study variables to be multivariate normal. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and goodness-of-fit test was used for testing 
normality. Additionally, the Shapiro-Wilk test (1965) was also adopted since 
it is a more robust normality test.  
Since the variables in a regression model contain time series, it is 
essential to undertake a stationary time series test to ensure the model is not 
biased. A stationarity test is undertaken since nonstationary variables in 
regression model shows that the asymptotic analysis assumptions are not 
valid. Thus, the normal "t-ratios" do not follow the t-distribution and therefore 
cannot validly test the regression parameter hypotheses. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test was undertaken in EXLTAT to assess for 
non-stationary. According to Gujarati (2003), if a time series is nonstationary, 
the study of its behavior is valid only for the time under consideration.    
The Hausman specification test was also undertaken to determine 
model suitability. The equations testing the various hypothesis can be 
estimated using different regression models, specifically the pooled-ordinary 
(OLS) least square, fixed effects or random effect models. Wooldridge (2010) 
postulates that pooled OLS is used when a different sample is selected for each 
year. However, in this case, the same sample is observed within a five-year 
period. Therefore, choice can be made between fixed effect or random effects. 
Suitability between the fixed and random effect was assessed through the 
Hausman test. The Hausman specification test posits that the estimates of the 
random and fixed effects models’ do not differ considerably. The Hausman 
test null hypothesis specifies that the random effects model is applicable while 
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the alternative hypothesis indicates that the fixed effects is more suitable. The 
Hausman test results follows the chi-square distribution. If it is lesser than the 
probability value, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the fixed effect model is 
better suited for the panel data. Wooldridge (2010) posits that if the Chi-square 
P-value is significant statistically (p˂0.05), the fixed effects model is 
preferred. The opposite is recommending the random effects model.  
The study adopted a census survey method where the total population 
of all corporations, publicly trading at the NSE numbering 64 as at December 
2017, were considered. However, the data from the 64 companies was sorted 
and cleaned, while complete data was obtained from 58 corporations as some 
companies had been delisted and fused with the private sector, new listings, 
and the loss of observations in other companies due to data unavailability and 
poor-quality data in some years. These 58 companies with complete data 
comprised of more than 90% of the sample.   
Beck and Wiersema (2013) explains that operationalization is the 
categorical description of a variable so that it can be measured. The four 
variables of the study were Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, 
Ownership Structure, and Corporate Value. Corporate Governance indicators 
included board independence (the proportion of autonomous non-executive 
members of the board), board size (logarithm of number of directors), board 
remuneration (natural log of payout to board members per year), and board 
gender diversity (proportion of female directors). That was in line with the 
measures adopted by Proudfoot (2016). In addition, equal weighted composite 
consisting of the four sub indicators (Board Independence, Board Size, Board 
Remuneration and Board Gender Diversity) formed the Corporate Governance 
measure. Capital structure was proxied by the leverage (proportion of debt to 
the total funding). Ownership structure was measured by the weighted average 
of ownership concentration (proportion of shareholders with 10% or more to 
the aggregate shareholding value), State ownership (Proportion of state 
ownership to aggregate ownership), foreign ownership (Proportion of foreign 
ownership to aggregate ownership), and family ownership (Proportion of 
family ownership to total ownership).   
Consequently, the corporate value was measured by an equal 
weighted average of Tobin Q, while Tobin Q was measured as shown below:                                                                  
 
Where MVE is Market value of Equity, BVD is Book Value of Debt, 
and BVA is Book Value of Asset. 
 
Data Analysis 
Sekaran and Bougie (2009) suggested a four-step approach for 
analyzing data, namely: preparing data for analysis (editing for accuracy, 
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completeness, and consistency); get an overview of the data (descriptive 
statistics); assess the goodness of fit (diagnostic tests); and finally, test the 
hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis was used to test the variables strength 
and direction. The Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26 
was used to analyze the data through descriptive and inferential statistics. This 
analysis is in line with the analysis used in earlier studies to examine the main 
effect, intervention, moderation, and joint effect (Okiro, 2014; Mang’unyi, 
2011). 
 To determine the intervening impact of Capital Structure on the 
Relationship between Corporate Governance and Corporate Value, the four 
steps approach demonstrated by Baron and Kenny (1986) was applied to test 
hypothesis one. 
Step 1: CVit= β0 + β1CGit + εit------------------------------------------------------(1) 
Step 2: CSit= β0 + β1CGit + εit------------------------------------------------------(2) 
Step 3: CVit = β0 + β1CSit + εi-------------------------------------------------------(3) 
Step 4: CVit = α + β1CGit + β2CSit+ εi---------------------------------------------(4) 
Where CV, CG, and CS are Corporate Value, Corporate Governance, 
Capital Structure respectively, and β0 is the intercept or Constant. β1- β2 are 
regression coefficient, ε is a random error term, i is the number of companies 
used in the sample, and t are the duration of the research. Corporate Value was 
measured by Tobin Q, while Corporate Governance is a weighted average of 
BI, BS, BR, and BGD. 
To test the moderating effect of the ownership structure on the 
relationship between Corporate Governance and Corporate Value, the Baron 
and Kenny’s (1986) approach for testing moderation was used. It entailed the 
moderating impact of ownership Structure on the relationship between 
Corporate Governance (CG) and the company’s value (CV). Here, Ownership 
Structure is the weighted average of Ownership Concentration, Foreign 
Ownership, State Ownership, and Family Ownership. The models for the 
hypothesis of Ownership Structure are as follows: 
CVit= β0 + β1CGit + β2OSit + β3CGOSit + εi---------------------------------------(5) 
To determine the joint effect of corporate governance, capital 
structure, and ownership structure on the company’s value, the model for 
testing the hypothesis is as follows: 
CVit = β0+ β1BIit + β2BSit + β3BRit + β4BGDit + β5CSit + β6OCit + 
β7FROit + β8SOit + β9FMOit + εi ---(1) 
Β1------β9 are the regression coefficients. BI, BS, BR, BGD, CS, OC, 
FRO, SO, FMO are Board Independence, Board Size, Board Remuneration, 
Board Gender Diversity, Capital Structure, Ownership Concentration, Foreign 
Ownership, State Ownership, and Family Ownership, respectively. CV 
represents Corporate Value (measured by Tobin Q), β0 is the intercept or 
Constant, β1- β9 are regression coefficient, ε is a random error term that 
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accounts for the unexplained variations, i is the number of companies used in 
the sample, and t are the duration of the research. 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics tools were employed to summarize the basic 
features of the data, which were collected by providing refined sample 
summaries and the adopted measures. Sekaran and Bougie (2009) contend that 
along with simple graphical analysis, descriptive analysis virtually forms the 
basis of every quantitative analysis of data. Descriptive statistics entails 
various measures and among them include maximum, minimum, mean, and 
standard errors of estimates. It further entails measures of symmetry such as 
skewness and kurtosis (data flatness or sharpness). The descriptive statistics 
results for all studied variables and the number of observations (N) are 
presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 







.55154 .85967 .6155420 .13845227 -.613 -.131 
Board Size .5485 1.1855 .8428597 .17567500 -1.147 .787 
Board 
Remuneration 
.34210 1.4480 .5551251 .14274991 -.326 -.678 
Board Gender 
Diversity 





.03597 .68459 .3317542 .14773027 -.028 -.959 
Foreign 
Ownership 
.01705 .68346 .3361216 .12877942 -.318 -.316 
State 
Ownership 
.2511 .78320 .1134344 .05277976 .257 -.243 
Family 
Ownership 
.011052 .73765 .4521073 .16858353 -.750 .005 
Capital 
Structure 
Leverage .02490 .86843 .4035326 .18608898 .278 -.562 
Source: Research Findings 
 
Using data from 58 listed companies over a five-year period led to 290 
data points (Table 1). Therefore, the findings indicate that the independent 
directors of the Kenyan listed companies made up 61.5% of the board size, 
with a maximum and minimum values of 86% and 55%, which were 
distributed on both sides of the average by 13.8% respectively. The results 
also showed that the companies had an average board size of 7 directors 
(antilog of 0.8428), with a maximum of 16 (antilog of 1.1855) directors, and 
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a minimum of 4 (antilog of 0.5485) directors that deviated by 2 (antilog differ 
from .1757) directors on either side of the mean, respectively. On average, the 
listed firms’ board remuneration was 3.6 (antilog of .5551) million Kenyan 
shillings, a minimum of 2.2 (antilog of .3421) million Kenyan shillings and a 
maximum of 28 (antilog of 1.4480) million Kenyan shillings that deviate by 
1.387 (antilog of .1427) million Kenyan shillings on both sides of the mean. 
The findings also show that female directors of Kenyan listed corporations 
constituted 25.4% of the corporate board, with a maximum and minimum of 
62% and 10% which were distributed on both sides of the mean by 9% 
respectively. 
Regarding ownership structure, the finding indicated that owners hold 
10% and above averaged 33% with a maximum of 68.5% and minimum of 
36% distributed on either side of the mean by 14.8% respectively. Foreign 
Ownership constituted 33.6% with a maximum and minimum of 68.3% and 
1.7% that deviate by 12.8% on either side of the mean, respectively. The 
findings further indicate that state ownership averaged 11.3% with a 
maximum of 78% and a minimum of 25% spread on either side of the mean 
by 5.3%. The results of the finding show that Family Ownership constituted 
45.2% with a maximum of 73.8% and a minimum of 1.1% that deviate by 
16.86% on either mean side. The findings indicate that capital structure use of 
debt is at 40.3% on average with a maximum of 86.8% and a minimum of 
2.5% spread on either side of the mean by 18.6%. The results also show that 
CG indicators of Board Independence, Size, Remuneration, and Gender 
Diversity had negative skewness. Furthermore, they also had negative 
Kurtosis except for Board Gender Diversity. Ownership Structure indicators 
of Ownership Concentration, Foreign, State and Family Ownerships, all had 
negative Skewness except for state ownership. Kurtosis for all of them were 
negatively skewed except for Family Ownership.  
 
Results of Diagnostic Tests 
This section tested the regression model statistical assumptions. 
Among them include test for independence, homogeneity, linearity, normality, 
multicollinearity, specification, and stationarity tests. The calculated values 
and respective thresholds of the four study variables are indicated in Table 2 
below: 
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Table 2. Summary of Diagnostic Tests 
Source: Research Findings 
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test was employed for testing normality due to its 
ability to identify a deviancy from normality due to either kurtosis, skewness, 
or both. The results indicate that the calculated p values (p> 0.05) were greater 
than 0.05, which is normality confirmation. The ANOVA linearity test which 
computes the nonlinear and the linear component of the variables pair was 
used for linearity testing, with an insignificant F value (p> 0.05) indicating 
linearity. The calculated P values for the linearity test were above 0.05, which 
confirmed the linear relationship (constant slope) between the dependent 
variable and the predictor variables.  
The independence of errors assumption, which means that the 
observations are independent, was also assessed using the Durbin-Watson test 
and the statistic ranges between 1.5 and 2.5. The calculated values ranged from 
2.108 to 2.232, which supports the independence of the error assumption. The 
Levene test was used for homoscedasticity testing. The test was not 
statistically significant at a=0.05, which confirmed homogeneity. Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) and tolerance (VIF reciprocal) were used for 
multicollinearity testing. Multicollinearity occurs when the explanatory 
variables are highly interrelated, thus making it hard to determine the real 
contribution of each predictor to the variance in the dependent variable. 
Sekaran and Bougie (2009) posits that the maximum VIF threshold value is 
10. The computed tolerance values were all greater than 1. It is reciprocal that 
the VIF was between one and three, and this was within the recommended 
threshold.  
The specification test proposed by Hausman was applied to select the 
appropriate panel data analysis method and to test cross-sectional random 
effect. It compared fixed and random effect models and found a Chi-square p 
value of 0.0001 which was statistically significant at 1% (p < 0.05), thus 
suggesting the use of the fixed effects model. The Fixed effect through general 
linear model under univariate regression analysis in SPSS was applied. The 
European Scientific Journal, ESJ                             ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
May 2021 edition Vol.17, No.15 
www.eujournal.org   316 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-unit root test was undertaken to assess for 
non-stationary. Since the computed p-values were less than the P- level alpha 
(P<0.05), it was therefore concluded that the data was stationary. 
 
Correlation Analysis 
Examining the correlation coefficients makes it possible to accept or 
reject the null hypothesis that correlation does not exist between the study 
variables. Sekaran and Bougie (2009) indicates that the collinearity degree 
between two indicators oscillates between +1 and -1. The +1 correlation means 
that a perfect and positive linear association exists between the variables, thus 
there is a multicollinearity problem.   
Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, and 
Corporate Value association was examined through correlation analysis using 
the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient method. Overally, the 
correlation coefficients were less than the 0.8 thresholds indicating that there 
was no concern for multicollinearity (Mang’unyi, 2011). Consequently, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that correlation does not exist between the 
explanatory variables. In this study, the results of the correlations are reported 
at 0.05 and 0.01 significant levels, which is consistent with other studies such 
as Alqisie (2014).   





















** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level and * at the 0.05 level. 
Source: Research Data 
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As shown in Table 3 above, positive statistical relationship was noted 
between Board Independence and Composite Corporate Governance, 
Ownership Concentration, Foreign Ownership, and Company Value (r=.47, 
p<0.01), (r=.13, p<0.05), (r=.25, p<0.01), and (r=.15, p<0.05) respectively. On 
the other hand, a negative statistical relationship exists between Board 
Remuneration and Independence (r=-.38, p<0.01). This means that as board 
independence increases, Composite Corporate Governance, Ownership 
Concentration, Foreign Ownership, and Corporate Value also increases. 
However, an increase in Board Independence results in a decrease in board 
remuneration as the sum of executive directors with higher pay are expected 
to decrease as non-executive increases. 
 
Hypothesis Testing and Findings 
The first objective aimed at assessing the intervening effect of Capital 
Structure on the relationship between CG and corporate value of entities 
trading at NSE. Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach, which suggests four 
steps, was undertaken when assessing the intervening effect of a mediating 
variable and its effect on the explanatory and response variables. The Baron 
and Kenny’s (1986) approach indicates that the analysis must meet four 
conditions for the intervention effect to be considered positive. Firstly, a 
significant relationship must exist between the independent and the dependent 
variable in the absence of an intervening variable. Secondly, a significant 
relationship must exist between the independent variable and the mediating 
variable. Thirdly, a significant relationship must also exist between the 
intervening variable and the dependent variable. Lastly, in controlling the 
impact of an intervening variable on a dependent variable, the impact of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable in the presence of the 
intervening variable is significant. 
The following null hypothesis was tested: 
H1: No significant intervening effect of capital structure on the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate value. 
Table 4 displays the study results obtained. 
Table 4. Regression Results of Corporate Governance (CG), Capital Structure (CS), and 
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Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
a. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
b. Dependent Variable: Capital Structure 
c. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
d. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
Source: Research Findings 
 
The results shown in the table indicates that Corporate Governance and 
Capital Structure do not significantly predict Corporate Value. Capital 
Structure does not predict Corporate Value when Corporate Governance is 
controlled. Therefore, CS has no significant intervening effect on the 
relationship between CC and CV. The Baron and Kenny’s (1986) rule requires 
that all the four steps should predict significant relationships between the 
variables. Therefore, Capital Structure has not intervened in the Relationship 
between CG and Corporate Value. Thus, the null hypothesis H1 cannot be 
rejected.  
The output of this study did not indicate the presence of a quantifiable 
intervening effect between CG, Capital Structure, and Corporate Value. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This could be described by 
the fact that in Kenya, the financial system is still considered to be 
underdeveloped and the significance of debt as an oversight tool - to lower the 
agency's costs - may not matter. From a firm’s standpoint, managers may be 
conscious of the ineffective debt oversight, allowing them to increase debt to 
gain more resources to serve their individual interests, stay in control, and not 
necessarily optimize shareholder wealth. This study findings were supported 
by results of research done by Mehrabanpour and Miri (2018) on the influence 
of CG Index on capital costs, risk, and performance. Contrary to this study, 
some past research has consistently found that value growth is positively 
impacted by capital structure decisions and corporate governance. Okiro 
(2014) found a direct and significant mediating impact of capital structure on 
the relationship between CG and corporate value. Agency theory has 
demonstrated that CG and Ownership Structure are essential factors to manage 
the conflicts and costs arising thereof (Stiglbauer, 2011). Capital Structure is 
a financial and governance tool that regulates the flow of decisions and 
activities in company management. However, Corporate Governance in 
isolation significantly affects Corporate Value when mediated by Capital 
Structure, and there is no significant relationship.  This implies that the Capital 
Structure may not be effective in influencing the Corporate Governance 
practices adopted by corporations quoted at NSE. This finding is supported by 
MM Theory which state that in a perfect market, capital structure does not 
matter. This was also supported by the findings of Saeed, Gull, and Rasheed 
(2013).  
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However, Okiro, Aduda, and Omoro (2015) found a significant 
intervening effect in the relationship. The lack of significant impact of capital 
structure in the relationship could be expounded by the fact that when 
corporate governance is strong, efficient independent directors would ensure 
that the company does not over leverage or under leverage and always act in 
such a way that corporate value is optimized. Shareholders with concentrated 
ownership would also keep monitoring the firm’s borrowings as they would 
be concerned about bankruptcy risk that can expose them. For state-controlled 
firms, the state would literally dictate the leverage levels and guaranteeing 
loans. The presence of Gender diversity would also help bring a balance thus 
minimizing the influence of capital structure. Therefore, this indicates that the 
Capital Structure may not be effective in influencing the Corporate 
Governance practices adopted by corporations quoted at NSE. 
The second objective of the study assessed the moderating effect of 
Ownership Structure on the relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Value. Also, the study hypothesized that the relationship between 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Value was not moderated by the 
Ownership Structure of public trading corporations at NSE. The following 
hypothesis was tested: 
H3: There is no significant moderating effect of Ownership 
Structure on the Relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Value 
The moderation effect was assessed through Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) approach. This method involves testing the main effects of the 
explanatory variable (Corporate Governance) on the response variable 
(Corporate Value), the effect of the moderating variable (Ownership 
Structure) on the dependent variable (Corporate Value), and the effect of the 
interacting term between CG and Ownership Structure (CG*OS) on the 
dependent variable (Corporate Value). 
Table 5. Regression Results Corporate Value, Corporate Governance, and Ownership 








Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure 
Predictors: (Constant), Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, CG*OS 
b. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
Source: Research Data 
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The full model (Model 2) illustrates that CG, Ownership Structure, and 
the interactive variable (CG*OS) significantly predicts Corporate Value 
(F=1.942, p<0.01, R2=.231 and Adj-R2=.125). Model 2 further indicates that 
variation in Corporate Value explained by Corporate Governance and 
Ownership Structure is 23.1% with the inclusion of interactive variables 
(CG*OS). The test of regression coefficients (β) shows that Ownership 
Structure (p<.01) is statistically significant in Model 1. In the second model, 
the coefficient (β) of Ownership Structure is statistically significant, while that 
of Corporate Governance and the interaction term (CG*OS) are not 
statistically significant. Given that the interaction term was not significant 
statistically (p>.05), the study documents that Ownership Structure has no 
moderating influence on the relationship between CG and corporate value. 
Thus, the finding failed to reject the null hypothesis. This can be expounded 
by the fact that strong corporate governance has already taken care of the 
interest of the owners, and corporation would perform based on the 
management compliance with governance requirement regardless of the 
corporate ownership structure. This could be due to the strong control of listed 
companies by regulatory authorities, which may not provide enough room for 
major shareholders, family, foreign owners, and state to influence key 
decisions.   
The overall implication is that Ownership Structure does not moderate 
the relationship of Corporate Governance and Corporate Value. Therefore, 
corporations would perform well irrespective of their ownership structure. 
This is, however, contrary to common assumptions that government control 
firms cannot compete with other firms as this control would affect their 
performance and that family and foreign ownership affect performance. It is 
also possible that since these firms are listed and are under similar regulations 
and codes of governance to comply with, the influence of ownership on their 
operation, decision, and performance is minimal and the owners tend to give 
them the freehand to operate as long as they comply with the best codes of 
governance. The findings are in line with the study of Rouf and Al-Harun 
(2011) that found the relationship not to be significant. This was also 
supported by Sunarsih and Oktaviani (2016) who argued that an insignificant 
link exists between ownership structure and entity’s performance. Several 
papers have provided a comprehensive survey giving mixed results of 
relationships (Stiglbauer, 2011; Vinh, 2017; Kumar, 2015).  
Ownership Concentration was found unable to moderate the 
relationship between CG and Corporate Value. This could be due to the strong 
control of listed companies by regulatory authorities, which may not provide 
enough room for major shareholders to influence key decisions. The major 
shareholders also may prefer to give free hand to management to optimize the 
corporate value when Corporate Governance adoption is strong. Foreign 
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Ownership did not significantly influence the relationship as they may prefer 
their ideas to be aligned to the local market dynamics and also give freedom 
to directors and management to operate. State Ownership influence in the 
relationship was also not significant as state actors may prefer leaving the 
running of the entity to appoint management and directors. Family Ownership 
for listed companies does not significantly affect the relationship between CG 
and Corporate Value. This is because the directors and Key management are 
generally family members of trusted confidants who can be relied on to run 
such companies without the interference of other family members. 
 
Joint Effect of Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Ownership 
Structure on Corporate Value 
The study’s third objective was to determine the joint effect of CG, 
Capital Structure, and Ownership Structure on Corporate Value for NSE listed 
entities. The study further hypothesized that the joint effect of CG, Capital 
Structure, and Ownership Structure on the Corporate Value of corporations 
quoted at the NSE was not statistically significant.  The following hypothesis 
was tested: 
H3: The joint effect of Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, 
and Ownership Structure on Corporate Value is not significant. 
The hypothesis was tested as follows: 
The regression equation was of the form: 
CVit = β0+ β1BIit + β2BSit + β3BRit + β4BGDit + β5CSit + β6OCit + β7FROit + 
β8SOit + β9FMOit + εi 
The results are shown in Table 6 below: 
Table 6. Regression Results Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, 
and Corporate Value 
 
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Independence, Board Size, Board Remuneration, Board 
Gender Diversity, Capital Structure, Ownership Concentration, Foreign Ownership, State 
Ownership, and Family Ownership. 
b. Dependent Variable: Corporate Value 
Source: Research findings 
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Table 6 demonstrates the findings of the multiple linear regression 
performed to investigate the joint link between CG, Capital Structure, 
Ownership Structure, and Corporate Value of corporations quoted at NSE. A 
significant link between Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and 
value (F=2.001, p<.01, R2=.372 Adj-R2=.186) was documented. The predictor 
variables accounted for 37.2% of Corporate Value. 
The model coefficients of Board Remuneration, Board Gender 
Diversity, and Ownership Concentration were statistically significant (β=-
1.81, p<.01, β=-.575, p<.05, and β=-.507, p<0.1 respectively), while the rest 
were not statistically significant. The other independent variables β and p 
values as indicated in Table 6 were Board Independence (β=.065, p>.05), 
Board Size (β=-.031, p>.05), Capital Structure (β=-.259, p>.05), Foreign 
Ownership (β = .17, p>.05), State Ownership (β=-.316, p>.05), and Family 
Ownership (β=.238, p>.05).  
From the findings, the relationships between Corporate Value and 
Board Independence, Board Size, Capital Structure, Foreign Ownership, State 
Ownership, and family Ownership were not significant statistically (p>.05).  
The relation between Board Remuneration, Board Gender Diversity and 
Ownership Concentration were, however, significant statistically (p<.01). 
Since the whole model was statistically significant (p<.01), Corporate 
Governance, Capital Structure, and Ownership Structure jointly had a 
significant relationship with the Corporate Value of companies listed at the 
NSE. The hypothesis H3 was therefore rejected. Fixed Effect regression 
results in Table 6 indicates that the model’s coefficients of Board 
Remuneration, Board Gender Diversity, and ownership concentration were 
statistically significant. Specifically, the model coefficient of BR shows a 
negative and significant relationship of 1.8. This means that as remuneration 
increases, corporate value will decrease by 1.8. Conversally, the coefficient of 
BGD of -0.575 means that an increase of 1% in Gender diversity would result 
in a decrease of -.5% in corporate value. The findings indicated that 
independence and size of the board were significantly associated to 
corporation value. The agency theory proposes that corporation's managers 
(agents) tend to consider their own interest, which affects enterprise value. 
With a bigger board, agency conflicts can be minimized through monitoring. 
Accordingly, enhanced independence of the board aids in careful monitoring 
of the agent, which helps increase stakeholder and investors’ confidence and 
thus lead to a robust Corporate Value. The finding suggests that corporations 
tend to achieve better results when the board and the company make ideal 
decisions. The study further found a significant and positive effect of 
ownership concentration on corporate value. This means that there is a clear 
evidence of existence of an active role in overseeing by large shareholders of 
the entities listed on the NSE. Similarly, the coefficient of ownership 
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concentration is positively significant. This infers that large ownership is 
positively related to corporate value, which is consistent with the findings of 
Chen (2012). Furthermore, this means that large ownership brings 
opportunities to the corporation through drive of large shareholder to gather 
information and actively monitor the firm as well as providing the necessary 
linkages. The description is reinforced by the agency theory, which suggests 
that increased firm monitoring, high information sharing, and visibility of 
management actions/ activities to shareholders reduces agency cost thereby 
enhancing firm value. An attention-grabbing observation is that in most 
models, these are some of the key variables used to test agency theories and 
trade-off theories in majority of the past studies. Nevertheless, they are not 
significantly and statistically linked to corporate value in the Kenyan Market. 
Specifically, they include the coefficients of the considered variables in 
several regressions. This suggests that the agency theory and the trade-off 
theories are only partly supported in emerging markets like Kenya to explain 
corporate value.   
The negative relationship between Capital Structure and Corporate 
governance is indicated by the negative coefficient (The leverage coefficient 
is negative and not significant) of beta in the joint effect model. This is further 
supported by no intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship 
between Corporate Governance and Corporate value, which illustrates the 
robustness of the findings. This could be explained by Rose (2017) who 
suggested that miscalculating the bankruptcy costs of reorganization or 
liquidation could result in companies running into more debt than their 
respective levels. Thus, a high debt ratio would reduce the company value. 
These findings fail to support majority of the existing theories, which imply 
the existence of a positive link between capital structure and corporate value 
but are in concurrence with majority of the studies in unindustrialized nations. 
The lack of intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship between 
CG and CV and the absence of relationship between capital structure and 
corporate value may be explicated by an emerging and transitional market. 
More so, Kenya has unique features compared to other industrialized 
countries. In the 1990s, Kenya introduced economic reform majorly on 
privatization programs, which shifted the centrally planned to a market 
economy. However, the Kenyan financial sector is still undeveloped and does 
not provide the necessary funding and monitoring support (Vincent et al., 
2015). 
The negative relationship between foreign ownership and company 
value could also be explained by the fact that there is too much control by 
foreign owners. This, in turn, restricts managers from the freedom of deciding 
debt level and having local initiative which may end up reducing corporate 
value. This finding is contrary to most studies which have found a positive 
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relationship with a justification that foreign ownership is expected to decrease 
the effect of agency costs resulting from management vested interest and sub 
optimal decision, which may result in reduced corporate value (Peters & 
Bagshaw, 2014; Haque, Arun, Dominic & Memba, 2015). This rebuts the 
expectation that foreign investors can enhance the governance system of firms 
through enhanced monitoring.  
The findings were also consistent with that of Okiro, Aduda, and 
Omoro (2015), who documented a significant impact of CG and capital 
structure on the performance of entities quoted at East Africa stock markets. 
They found a significant joint influence of CG, Capital Structure, and 
Regulations on corporate performance, but this was inconsistent with this 
study. They also found a significant mediating effect of capital structure on 
the relationship between CG and entity’s performance and a significant 
moderating effect of regulation on the relationship. 
Furthermore, the presence of the joint and positive relationship 
indicates that quoted corporations with good Corporate Governance, optimal 
Capital Structure, and supportive Ownership Structure obtain higher 
Corporate Value growth. The findings indicated that independence and size of 
the board were significantly associated to corporation value. The agency 
theory proposes that corporation's managers (agents) tend to consider their 
own interest, which affects enterprise value. With a bigger board, monitoring 
can help minimize the agency conflicts, while enhanced independence of the 
board ensures that agents are carefully supervised. This will help to increase 
the confidence of stakeholders and investors, thereby resulting in a robust 
Tobin-Q. The finding implication is that when the corporate board and 
Companies make ideal decisions, entities tend to achieve good results. Finally, 
Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Ownership Structure jointly 
predict Corporate Value. Thus, quoted firms with good Corporate 
Governance, optimal Capital Structure, and supportive Ownership Structure 
obtain higher Corporate Value growth. 
 
Conclusion 
The study concludes that capital structure does not intervene in the 
relationship between Corporate Governance and Corporate value. This implies 
that the Capital Structure may not be effective in influencing the Corporate 
Governance practices adopted by corporations quoted at NSE. This could 
further be expounded by the fact that the Kenyan financial system is still 
considered to be undeveloped and the significance of debt as an oversight tool 
- to lower the agency's costs - may not matter. From a firm’s standpoint, 
managers may be conscious of the ineffective debt oversight, thereby allowing 
them to increase debt to gain more resources to serve their individual interests, 
stay in control, and not necessarily optimize shareholder wealth.  
European Scientific Journal, ESJ                             ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
May 2021 edition Vol.17, No.15 
www.eujournal.org   325 
Ownership Concentration was found not to moderate the relationship 
between CG and Corporate Value. This could be due to the strong control of 
listed companies by regulatory authorities which may not provide enough 
room for major shareholders, family, foreign owners, and state to influence 
key decisions. Finally, Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and 
Ownership Structure jointly predict Corporate Value. Thus, quoted firms with 
good Corporate Governance, optimal Capital Structure, and supportive 
Ownership Structure obtain higher Corporate Value growth. The findings 
indicated that independence and size of the board were significantly associated 
to corporation value. Therefore, the agency theory proposes that corporation's 
managers (agents) tend to consider their own interest, which affects enterprise 
value. With a larger board, agency conflicts can be minimized through 
enhanced oversight, and greater board independence ensures that managers 
are closely monitored. This, in turn, leads to increased confidence level for 
stakeholders and investors and a stronger company value is generated. This 
finding therefore indicates that corporations tend to achieve better results 
when the board and company make better optimal decisions.   
The obtained study results complement the existing knowledge on 
Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, and Corporate 
Value. The study’s contribution to knowledge focused on the intervening 
effect of Capital Structure on the Relationship between CG and Corporate 
Value. The direct effect of Capital Structure and Corporate Value has been 
evaluated by few past studies (Adera et al., 2015; Bokhari & Khan, 2013; 
Dumont & Svensson, 2014). Most authors have largely explored the direct 
effects of CG on Corporate Value (Padmanabha & Rathish, 2017; Vincent et 
al., 2015). The results documented in the past studies have not only been 
conflicting but also varying. This research provides an assessment of the 
intervening effect of capital structure on the relationship between CG and 
company value. In particular, the approach by Baron and Kenney (1986) was 
used in the analysis to assess intervening relationship. Another contribution to 
knowledge is that Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Ownership 
Structure, and Corporate Value jointly predict Corporate Value. Several 
existing studies have assessed the relationships among Corporate Governance, 
Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Value (M’Ithiria & 
Musyoki, 2014; Holderness, 2016; Okiro, 2014). However, the variables were 
separately examined or not in a similar combination. Also, the measures of the 
considered four variables employed in past studies were different and the 
results were also inconsistent and inconclusive.  
This study also makes contribution to the contradictory theories on 
corporate governance by analyzing empirically the interrelationships among 
Corporate Governance, capital structure, Ownership structure, and corporate 
value. This will resolve conflicts in the theories that document contradictory 
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propositions on the effects of Corporate Governance, capital structure, and 
ownership on firm performance such as Agency, Stewardship, trade-off and 
Stakeholder theories. The findings of this study make contribution to practice 
and policy by improving the understanding of the Corporate Governance 
mechanisms that influence Corporate Value.  
Furthermore, this study contributes to future research by testing 
empirically the interrelationships among corporate governance, capital 
structure, ownership structure, and corporate value. The results of the study 
provide a room for further study of the concepts in Kenya and beyond. Given 
the cost-benefit tradeoff in adhering to increased governance standards, it 
remains unclear whether enhanced governance, as replicated in higher 
compliance, translates to improved business performance. This study also 
supplements literature on adequacy of rules and regulations. It explicitly 
assesses exogenous changes in the management structure and reduces the 
potential problem of endogeneity. The study also used a fixed effect estimate 
to address endogeneity concerns. It further expands research on how 
institution-initiated improved governance affects voluntary governance. Most 
existing studies have concentrated on the market perceived benefits of 
changing governance. The study approach is a long-run study of real 
improvements in shareholder wealth.   
In addition, the results of this study generate several contributions to 
policy and practice of the corporate board, management, investor, and 
regulatory bodies in general. The effects of CG on company value presented 
in this study have an implication to corporate boards. The fact that an 
association exists between corporate governance and corporate value shows 
that the supervisory activities of the board directly influence company value. 
Properly constituted corporate boards translate into better results, financial 
performance, and the appreciation of firm value. Effective corporate 
governance can be seen through committees of the board of directors, and it 
brings the interests of the representative in line with the interests of the 
stockholders (principals). The study assists corporate management to 
appreciate the linkages between board activities, management functions, and 
Corporate Value of NSE listed firms. The fact that Capital Structure does not 
intervene in the relationship between Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Value could be an indicator that Capital Structure is irrelevant in line with the 
Modigliani theory of capital irrelevance theory. There could therefore be a 
need to re-evaluate the finance decision criteria of the company to see whether 
it aims at optimizing corporate value or whether most of the decision do not 
involve direct funding by the company. The results of this study will also 
benefit debt securities investors as well as equity investors, who endure risks 
of companies’ failure to meet their contractual obligations by guiding them in 
the criteria for making lending decision, which is grounded on corporate 
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governance strength of an entity. The study shows that the link between the 
CG mechanisms, capital structure and ownership structure lead to better 
company values that benefit all parties. 
The finding also reveal that the Ownership Structure which is a sub 
variable of shareholdings by the state jointly affects Corporate Value. This 
suggests that the privatization of public corporations would add value to them. 
The government should therefore continue and if possible, accelerate the 
privatization effort which has been ongoing. Companies like Kengen which 
had been partially privatized previously should be fully privatized, while 
others such as Kenya Power, consolidated bank, Kenya meat, Mumias Sugar, 
Kenya airways among others should be fully privatized to improve their 
performance. Thus, this study is supportive of the current direction that has 
privatized several state-owned companies. This has gradually enhanced 
governance in former state-owned companies and has continued to increase 
their efficiency and value creation. 
This study was also grounded on positivism philosophy, and the goal 
was to empirically test hypotheses so as to confirm or falsify present theories 
in the area. The research outcomes supplement the theories by establishing 
interrelationships between the variables. The Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
agency theory was useful in bringing out the association between the 
principals and agents. The agent (in this case directors and managers) 
represents the principal (in this case shareholders) in a certain corporate 
transaction (oversight and management) and is anticipated to enhance the 
principal’s interests (enhancing firm value through financial performance) 
without regard to personal interests.  
The study findings further emphasize that agency problems arise when 
the interests of owners (principals) and corporate agents’ conflict. Listed 
companies should therefore look for ways to minimize conflicting situations 
between the agents and principals as well as capital and ownership structure 
through a solid corporate policy. Since the Capital Structure does not intervene 
in the relationship between CG and Corporate Value, the study provides 
support to agency problems among listed firms at the NSE. As a theoretical 
contribution, incentives through regulations and monitoring should be 
provided to managers to direct their decisions (capital structure decisions) in 
order to realign these decisions to the interest of the principal. Further CG 
mechanism such as board independence, size, remuneration, and gender 
diversity of firms quoted at the NSE should be aligned to shareholders’ 
interest. 
Another practice recommendation that managers and policymakers 
can make to significantly impact performance emerge from the key insight, 
which responded to a key research question. These are the results of a positive 
and significant combined effect of CG, capital structure, and ownership 
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structure, which - as the results explain- support the assertion that 
mismanagement, business failure, corruption, fraud, and poor performance 
emanate from agency's costs. This is related to the loss of authority, control, 
and power by the owners to managers (agents) as the businesses grow and 
become multifaceted. Therefore, it is vital that the board prioritizes the 
implementation of codes of proper conduct, company laws, corporate 
governance principles, and other supervisory guidelines. Firms should make 
sure that board independence is maintained and as well ensure that the size of 
the board is appropriate to confirm ideal performance and oversight and 
resources management.  
The results of the study also suggested that the oversight role of debt 
was not significant. This is as a result of the non-significance of intervening 
effect of capital structure on the relationship between CG and CV as well as 
the negative coefficient of the capital structure in the joint effect mode. The 
results also confirm that the agency's theory supposition that a conflict of 
interest exists between investors and managers due to information 
asymmetries and poorly developed financial system. Therefore, there is a need 
for greater transparency and information availability in the marketplace and 
additional regulation must be considered.  
Family (which dominates concentrated ownership cases) and 
foreigners as ultimate shareholders jointly affect investment performance. 
Incentives should be put in place to attract foreign shareholders to buy more 
shares in listed companies. Corporate governance principles targeting family 
majority owned units should also be developed to enhance their governance 
and controls. 
The interests of all stakeholders should always be protected and 
stimulated to take part in corporate governance processes. Another 
recommendation for practice is that financial market analysts and investors 
can apply the study to bring sound regulation in financial markets. Here, the 
analysts promote firms that have adopted optimally corporate codes of good 
practice by highlighting their performance and availing information to 
regulatory bodies and potential investors. The investors should also prefer to 
invest mostly in well-governed firms. Regulators based information provided 
by the analysts and firms’ personal reports should then ensure compliance 
adherence. Management should be interested in implementing regulations and 
controls to achieve high profits and maximum shareholders’ capital. 
In addition, this study provides regulators with a foundation for 
strengthening codes of conduct, laws, and regulations, and fully adopting 
corporate governance principles by publicly traded companies in order to 
maximize growth in company value. This would permit the regulators to 
implement the best structure that provides a plan for diversification into other 
countries and regions with well-defined guidelines and reporting functions 
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that meet the expectations of the Board and shareholders. An excellent 
relationship should be established between the board, management, and other 
stakeholders, which can be achieved through regular consultations so that all 
stakeholders can work together. 
Another actionable policy was revealed through the finding that when 
companies have bigger boards, they post good performance. Bigger boards 
give professional managers more freedom to exercise judgment and help 
create additional space for new knowledge. This could also mean more space 
to bring in different stakeholders within the dominant ownership, to draw on 
professional skills, and to permit access to a broader range of knowledge and 
possibly accessibility to wide range of individual and family networks. Listed 
firms with small boards or less diverse boards should consider expanding their 
board membership to include gender balance, specialized skills, more 
resourceful board members, people with political funding, and other needed 
connections among others. The findings of previous studies have 
recommended the board size to be between 6 and 9. However, this should be 
determined by the size, complexity, and the technicality of the company in 
question (Alqisie, 2014; Velte, 2017; Eyenubo, 2013; Proudfoot, 2016). 
Although the study answered the proposed question and provided 
insights on the effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Value, as well as 
intervening and moderating effect of capital structure and ownership structure 
respectively on corporate value, it still contains some limitation. One of such 
limitation is that the data collection period is relatively short. The observations 
span for only five years, from 2013 to 2017, and this may not be long enough 
because the market and government issues keep changing from time to time. 
The period of data should be longer to make the results more robust and 
conclusive to justify the dynamic nature of the market and governing laws and 
regulations.  
The study used four attributes of the corporate governance, one 
attribute of the capital structure, four attributes of the ownership structure, and 
one attributes of the corporate value. The findings of this study are limited to 
the adopted attributes. There are other attributes that could affect the tested 
relationships, but researchers may not be able to use them due to 
sensitivity/confidentiality of such information. In addition, the investigation 
encountered obstacles in collecting adequate corporate governance data. This 
is due to a culture of confidentiality around asset information in Kenya and 
the lack of strict laws to force all corporations to make available adequate 
reports. This led to missing data values, which might affect the results 
reliability.  
Examining just one country can be a weakness in applying research 
results. Although Kenya is a transition and developing state, it is generally 
debated that sampling several countries produces more persuasive results. 
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However, Kenya is a case in point while other unindustrialized states may 
share characteristics and findings like the documented research results. 
Additionally, the single-country study permitted in-depth investigation that 
may not be possible in multi-country context.     
In this research, the fixed effects model was used to capture common 
problems such as the unobserved effects, heteroscedasticity, and possible 
endogeneity issues. It is not definite that all econometric problems have been 
fully controlled, particularly regarding endogeneity. The reason is that the 
fixed effect model captures mostly unobserved heterogeneity. The model does 
not consider the problem of endogeneity caused by measurement errors, 
inverse causality, and time-invariant endogenous variables that are common 
in financial research. The study did not also consider the possible reverse 
relationship where corporate value may influence capital structure adopted by 
the company. For example, a company that has been profitable in the past and 
is likely to continue being profitable with plenty of extra cash like Safaricom 
may not need any outside debt. However, the above documented limitations 
have not diluted the study quality. The study and its results have made wide-
ranging contributions to the obtainable knowledge base in corporate 
governance, which still offers plenty of room for additional studies. 
Further research may consider incorporating the boards’ behavioral 
aspects. Various researchers in industrialized states have lately begun 
investigating the corporate board's practices by attendance of its actual 
meetings. Such requires investigation by researchers in emerging countries. 
Thu, there is a need to move beyond quantitative research, which produces a 
mixture of results to possibly more qualitative approaches to how it actually 
works from an insider's perspective. Extending this current research to a more 
comprehensive study of board decision-making and dynamics would be the 
beginning of developing a better understanding of corporate governance.   
Future researchers could incorporate other measures of performance, 
both non-financial and financial other than just the Tobin Q. A related study 
can be replicated in other countries regionally and internationally. This would 
further validate the findings of the present and forthcoming studies. This 
should involve expanding the study to other regional markets like COMESA 
or a more detailed study concentrating on separate market segments at the NSE 
to identify any variations in the obtained results. Additional or different 
variables other than corporate governance, capital structure, and ownership 
structure can also be considered in the future to enrich corporate governance 
studies generally and deepen understanding even further. 
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